T he growing sophistication of component technologies and the rising costs and uncertainties of developing and launching new products require firms to collaborate in the development of new products. However, the management of new product development that occurs jointly between firms presents a new set of challenges in sharing the costs and benefits of innovation. Although collaboration enables each firm to focus on what it does best, it also introduces new issues associated with the alignment of decisions and incentives that have to be managed alongside conventional performance and timing uncertainties of new product development. In this paper, we conceptualize and formulate the joint development of products involving two firms with differing development capabilities and examine the implications of arrangements that go beyond sharing of revenues to include sharing of development cost and work. We term these approaches that involve sharing of the development cost and sharing of the development work investment sharing and innovation sharing, respectively. These cost and effort sharing mechanisms have subtle interactions with the degree to which revenues are shared between firms and the type of development project under consideration. Our analysis shows that investment and innovation sharing are particularly relevant for products with no preexisting revenues, and their benefits also depend on the degree to which revenues are shared between the firms. Whereas investment sharing is more attractive for new-to-the-world product projects with significant timing uncertainty, innovation sharing plays an important role in environments where projects experience product quality uncertainty, firms are similar in their capabilities, and the costs of integration of work across firms can be controlled. Our key contribution involves the modeling of joint work and decision making between collaborating firms and unearthing the complementary role of revenue, cost, and innovative effort sharing mechanisms for new product development. We translate our analytical findings into a managerial framework and illustrate the results with examples from the life-sciences and electronics industries.
Introduction
New product innovation has long been a key avenue for revenue and profit growth, especially in industries such as life sciences and high technology. With lifetimes of products shrinking, technical complexity increasing, and daunting odds of success a norm, firms are forced to invest continually and evergrowing amounts to maintain their competitive edge. In response, some firms have looked beyond their four walls to manage the costs and risks of new product development (Quinn 2000) . Pharmaceutical companies increasingly turn to each other and partner with specialist firms to develop new compounds that cost nearly a billion dollars to launch (Grover 1998) . Articles trace HP's development of its highly profitable printer business to joint work with suppliers during different phases of its business. Even companies with a strong patent portfolio and research budgets such as IBM have begun forging joint-development agreements to meet the challenges of contemporary products and markets (Austin American Statesman 2003) .
The increasing uncertainty, complexity of knowhow, and costs of product development and distribution require firms to pool their resources and enter into joint-development contracts involving the sharing of product revenues, development costs, and research and development (R&D) effort between industrial customers and suppliers, which forms the focus of this paper. Although intercompany alliance issues such as the melding of cultures have received a fair amount of research attention in the strategic management and organizational behavior literature (reviewed in the next section), the operational challenges of joint development are equally complex but relatively understudied. Unlike manufacturing and assembly, where activities can sometimes be outsourced in an arms-length transfer of prices and quantities, product development is an uncertain and long-lead-time activity with advance investments and joint work between firms that requires coordination about product features and qualities. In consolidating and converging industries such as high technology, firms may also fear that their partners may appropriate a large portion of the benefits. The classic product development challenges of managing technology and market uncertainty are coupled with agency issues stemming from opportunistic behavior of development partners.
In this paper, we focus on a specific form of joint development between two firms that consider sharing the product revenues, development costs, and development effort. The product being developed is based on an uncertain underlying technology/science, and the firms could differ in their development capabilities as well as their power in the value chain. We now discuss the nuances of joint development in two of the industries that we studied.
Managerial Issues in Collaborative New
Product Development Product development plays a crucial role in the biopharmaceutical industry, which involves the application of biotechnology research to the development of pharmaceutical compounds. Ever since the invention of recombinant insulin in 1982, the application of biotechnology to the creation of therapeutic drugs has grown dramatically. Due to the know-how required in R&D and the large investments needed for commercialization, small biotechnology companies often work with large pharmaceutical companies. To understand codevelopment in this industry, we surveyed a collection of articles and conducted a detailed interviewdriven field study of joint development between two firms, which we will call Alpha Labs (a small public U.S. biotech company) and Mega Pharmaceuticals (a large Fortune 100 pharmaceutical company).
In September 2002, Alpha and Mega entered into an agreement to work on the development and commercialization of a new innovative class of diabetes drugs. Under the terms of this negotiated agreement, Alpha and Mega agreed to share equally in the development investment, with Mega making an upfront investment based on an estimate of the development costs. Alpha performed the drug development, while Mega helped to commercialize and distribute the product with its vast global salesforce, and in return the firms agreed to share the revenues (30% of U.S. domestic revenues and 80% of international revenues accrued to Mega, and the remainder went to Alpha). It is noteworthy that despite its significant development and testing capabilities and infrastructure, Mega decided to fund the development work at Alpha rather than share the development and testing work. Alpha developers kept detailed records of their time spent in the project, and Alpha's alliance manager would report the fulltime equivalent of scientist/developer time invested in the project every quarter, upon which Mega would reimburse Alpha for the expense. We call this pattern of multifirm product development where the collaborating companies share the development expense with one firm doing the bulk of the work, investment sharing. This pattern has been observed with several other firms in the industry as illustrated also in the recent example of Actelion and Glaxo (Whalen 2008) .
Consider, on the other hand, product development at the firm Dell. Although Dell is known widely as a direct and lean distributor of computers, its ability to leverage the technological capabilities of its component suppliers is also noteworthy. Dell's product design processes are deliberately designed to support and complement supplier innovation with strengths in customer needs identification, complementary hardware/software development, component qualification and testing, system integration, beta testing, and market feedback. For example, Dell worked closely with Lexmark in 2002 and enhanced Lexmark's printer technology with an innovative Dell-developed cartridge replenishment software, and both firms shared the revenues (Financial Times 2003) . Dell has also built its other product lines such as laptops, servers, and storage products through joint-development arrangements with supply chain partners, in which Dell shares downstream development and testing work. Thomke et al. (1999) discuss how Dell worked with Sony to bring to market Sony's lithium ion battery technology.
Dell's joint-development approach is in contrast to the investment sharing approach used by Mega in that it partakes in the development work in areas of qualification, testing, and system integration. We refer to such an approach in which the development work is shared without an upfront transfer of money, innovation sharing. Although both investment and innovation sharing approaches seem to be signals to partners about a firm's commitment, the question arises as to what effect they have on the extent of product development and profits. What impact does development uncertainty have on these cost, revenue, and effort sharing agreements between jointdevelopment partners? How should firms split the value that is created by their collaborative efforts? What role do their bargaining power and outside options play in the structure and execution of the joint-development process? These are some of the questions that constitute our focus in this paper.
We seek to model the interaction between two firms who embark on an opportunity to invest in a development project that could improve the performance quality of a product but faces uncertainties related to underlying technology which discourage investment. In addition, the firms may have reservations about the opportunistic behavior of their partners, who may appropriate the gains from the innovation. How then can a firm address these reservations and achieve maximal quality improvement and profits? The twofirm decision-making model and the revenue, effort, and cost sharing mechanisms proposed in this paper are intended to help firms manage collaborative product development under such conditions of technology, market, and partner uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related work in §2, we present a model of two-firm product development in §3. We methodically analyze the different mechanisms for coordinating multifirm product development in §4, identifying key properties and evaluating their ability to deal with different types of development projects. In § §5 and 6, we develop the main results of this paper, comparing and contrasting the different mechanisms and demarcating the domains of appropriateness of the revenue, cost, and effort sharing mechanisms. Finally, in §7, we summarize the managerial implications using a conceptual framework, relate to examples presented above, and point to directions for future work.
Relevant Literature
New product development has been a topic of significant research interest in the operations literature in recent years, but most of the literature on product development is single-firm-centric with its focus at the level of a project or, at best, a product line. More recently, there has been an emerging stream of work on the interactions between product and supply chain design decisions (Fine and Whitney 1996 , Anderson and Parker 2002 , Novak and Eppinger 2001 , Ulrich and Ellison 2005 , Grahovac and Parker 2002 . Even this literature focuses only on how a single firm should make decisions involving its suppliers and not on the interaction between the decisions of firms. Erat and Kavadias (2006) study the development of products in an industrial context, but their focus is on intertemporal discrimination of a technology supplier through partial adoption of technology and not on the joint development of products by multiple firms. Our work builds on the model of product development under technology uncertainty from the new product operations literature (Loch and Terwiesch 1998) , but breaks new ground in the area of joint product development.
The technology management literature considers institutional alliances but ignores the role of uncertainty in development decision making (Dutta and Weiss 1997, Amaldoss et al. 2000) , or limits itself to institutional alliances and the challenge of integrating cultures in such ventures (Doz and Hamel 1998) . Despite the challenges of contractual joint development, many products do not warrant the huge investments in time and money required for institutional alliances, such as joint ventures. Management of institutional alliances often requires the establishment of a separate organization with investments of hundreds of millions of dollars as well as the blending of established organizational cultures (Doz and Hamel 1998) . Although there are a few highprofile success stories of joint ventures, their mixed record (as evidenced by examples such as the Iridium alliance or the IBM-Motorola RISC technology venture) and their high investments make firms pause (before spending large amounts of money in institutional alliances) and look for alternative approaches to joint development. Contractual joint developmentthat begins with the recognition that a supplier that invests in component technological innovation cannot take for granted the possibility of both the development succeeding and other value-chain participants making mutually aligned decisions if the innovation materializes-seeks to achieve the benefits of collaboration without the significant fixed costs of institutional alliances (Gerwin and Ferris 2004) . Customer firms that wish to tap into the technological knowhow of their suppliers have to develop mechanisms to address these supplier concerns, stimulate innovation, and thereby realize the full potential of the collaborative development process. Gerwin and Ferris (2004) provide a qualitative discussion of a taxonomy of alliances in product development projects, highlighting the role of contractual alliances. Dyer (2003) paints a rich portrait of the weaknesses of both vertical integration and arms-length supplier management using examples from Chrysler and Toyota, but focuses more broadly on the issue of trust than on the specifics of sharing effort and development.
Several papers in economics, marketing, and supply chain operations that study the interaction between vertical firms have proposed mechanisms to alleviate tactical (price-quantity) coordination problems (Jeuland and Shugan 1983 , Lee and Staelin 1997 , McGuire and Staelin 1983 , Aghion and Tirole 1994 , Grossman and Hart 1986 , Cachon and Lariviere 2005 , Spencer and Brander 1992 , Cvsa and Gilbert 2002 . Attempts have also been made to use similar models to analyze the effect of innovation of one of the firms on its channel partners. Gupta and Loulou (1998) study how interactions between firms in a channel affect innovation. Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) analyze the effect of strategic commitment to price by a supplier to stimulate downstream innovation in a supply chain. However, this stream of literature deals mostly with process innovations and tactical decisions like prices and quantities, and ignores the effect of technological uncertainty on firms' decision making. Our paper, focused on collaborative product innovation, borrows some modeling elements from this stream, but differs significantly in that it emphasizes uncertainty of technologies and goes beyond interfirm coordination based on prices and quantities. We evaluate product development decision making that focuses on product quality improvements through cost or effort sharing arrangements between firms and examine how firms should incorporate the underlying technological and market parameters of an industry while entering into partnerships.
The Model
In this section, we model the collaborative product development process between two firms that must decide about sharing the revenues and costs of an innovation. This innovation along a certain technological dimension could improve the performance quality of the focal product and has the potential to enhance end-customer demand. However, the innovation itself is fraught with risks and requires investments in time and money. We model the development/innovation process as comprising of two distinct phases-one involving the development of a key underlying technology, and the second involving the packaging and integration of this technology into a new product/system-handled by two independent firms; a focal firm (FF) and a partner firm (PF). Note that the complementary nature of these activities and specialized skills that these activities entail imply that the two firms have to come together to partner in development to realize the value of the innovation. To be general, we have chosen neutral terminology, although in specific situations (such as the examples discussed earlier), one of the firms may have an expertise in certain aspects of technology/product development. The two firms could share the revenues as well as the development expense or the effort, which we refer to as investment and innovation sharing, respectively.
Model of Innovation
The innovation we model is such that the improvement in quality does not increase a firm's marginal costs. Abbott (1953) terms such improvements "innovational quality dimensions"-the introduction of a novel quality that is judged superior by most or all buyers and costs no more to produce, thus making the older quality obsolete. However, the innovation entails costs: a firm decides the level of quality improvement (innovation) that it wants to achieve, and it incurs both a fixed cost of development and a variable time-dependent cost of resource deployment to achieve this quality improvement. In addition, when the development effort is distributed between the firms, integration costs are incurred as discussed later in this section.
The fixed cost of development is an upfront investment and is a function of the level of quality improvement . 1 We model that this cost is of the form I , where I is an investment parameter. We assume that > 1, implying that the cost of innovation is convex with respect to (w.r.t.) . Convexity is not a driving factor for much of our analysis (specifically not impacting revenue sharing and investment sharing), and it does have empirical backing in literature; see, for example, Klepper (1992, 1996) and Kamien and Schwartz (1992) . Convex costs are often attributed to diminishing returns from R&D expenditures or to diseconomies of scale that, in practice, can be linked to bureaucracies in a larger firm that stifle creativity and impede innovation. Also, as the level of technological innovation increases, diseconomies in offering employment contracts could also lead to diseconomies of scale in R&D (Zenger 1994) . Throughout the body of this paper, we assume that the convexity parameter = 2. However, directionality of the results is preserved for any > 1.
In addition to the fixed development cost, a firm would also have to dedicate resources to the technology development process. To accommodate the fact that higher levels of quality improvement require more resources, we assume that these costs are proportional to the level of quality improvement . Also, because the firm would have to dedicate these resources throughout the course of the development process, we assume that these costs are proportional to the development time. Specifically, we model these costs as ct , where c is a constant and t is the total time taken for technology and product development. Thus, the total fixed and variable costs of development (not including integration costs) for a firm that improves the quality by would be
Investments in quality improvement enable the firm to command higher margins and increase profitability, which we capture by assuming that there is a one-toone correspondence between the quality of the final product and the subsequent revenues that firms are able to generate in the end-product market. In particular, we model that an innovation level generates a total additional value of V = r . If the residual value of the product before the innovation is , then the total value after the innovation is successful can be represented as T V = + r . When = 0, the final value of the product depends entirely on the innovation, and we refer to these projects as new-revenue projects. In contrast, when > 0, the value of the project does not depend entirely on the innovation that is undertaken. Such projects can be considered as replacement-revenue projects.
Model of Interfirm Interaction
Firms can engage in joint development in numerous ways. To begin making a contribution in modeling joint development, we start with specific forms of revenue and cost sharing between firms inspired by industrial examples presented earlier.
To maintain focus on how product development issues influence the collaboration between firms, we consider a baseline case in which the focal and partner firms are currently in a revenue sharing agreement wherein the focal firm gets a fraction of the total revenue (which can be decided endogenously or can be an exogenous parameter), whereas the partner firm receives (1 − ) of the revenue. Revenue sharing has been shown to be a useful mechanism for coordination in the supply chain literature that deals primarily with postlaunch price-quantity decisions; our interest here is in understanding how it combines with prelaunch cost sharing and influences quality and development investment decisions. In addition, to a pure revenue sharing agreement, firms can also enter into an investment sharing or an innovation sharing agreement. Under investment sharing, firms share the cost of product development, whereas under innovation sharing, they share the innovation itself, with part of the work being done by each of the firms.
At first, we analyze the case in which the revenue sharing parameter is an exogenous parameter, which could be the case in mature markets where preexisting relationships or channel power equations could form the basis of how revenues are shared between collaborating firms. In contrast, negotiation between innovating firms could form the basis of such division of revenues in emerging markets. To accommodate such markets, we also consider the case in which the equilibrium revenue sharing parameter is determined as a function of the bargaining between collaborating firms. Subsequently, we examine the impact of this bargaining framework on pure revenue, investment, and innovation sharing agreements. The complementary roles of FF and PF imply that the firms have to work together to realize the value of the project. The central questions then become what mechanism should be used to operationalize codevelopment and how the value realized from codevelopment should be shared between firms. In all of these analyses, we assume that firms agree to use the bargaining structure proposed by Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 to determine the optimal contract terms. In a Nash bargaining game, two players cooperatively decide to how to split the surplus that occurs as a result of their interaction. The manner in which the surplus is split depends both on the utility functions of both players as well as the value of their outside option (the value they are able to obtain if they choose not bargain with each other). Please refer to Owen (1995) for more details of the bargaining process. Initially, we assume that the outside option of both firms are the same and, without loss of generality, normalize this value to zero. Subsequently, we relax this assumption and numerically evaluate the effect of different outside options for FF and PF on the optimal mode of codevelopment. The sequence of decision making, represented in Figure 1 , is as follows. At first, FF decides which of the codevelopment mechanisms should be used to conduct the development project. The firms then cooperatively determine how the revenues and costs of the innovation should be shared. Subsequently, the investment for the development project is made, the value of which is realized at the end of the development process once technology uncertainty is resolved.
To understand how each of these agreements impacts the technology development process and a firm's costs and revenues, let us examine these agreements more closely. When firms enter into an investment sharing agreement, one firm conducts the development work while the other agrees to bear part of the development costs. Let k be the fraction of development costs borne by the focal firm. Similar to pure revenue sharing, the technology development itself could be conducted by the focal or partner firm, which we analyze in detail in the next section.
Innovation sharing entails the splitting of the development work across both firms, so its form and function differ in a subtle fashion from investment sharing. Specifically, a part of the development work F is done by the focal firm (who incurs a fixed cost I 2 F ), and a
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part of the development work P is conducted by the partner firm (who incurs the fixed cost I 2 P ). Note that convexity of the fixed development costs allows us to capture the effect that the division of innovation across the two firms could lead to lower development costs compared with the case in which this innovation were to be done in a single firm (which is what we would expect, because such division of work would enable firms to do what they do best). However, innovation sharing entails distributed development, which could result in firms having to incur additional integration costs to merge quality improvements achieved across firms. Realistically, these costs would depend on the level of innovation that is undertaken by each of the firms. Specifically, when FF and PF invest F and P , respectively, we consider several models of integration costs, the simplest of which has the following functional form:
which implies that the integration cost is increasing in the level of innovation undertaken by both firms. Other forms of integration costs are considered in Technical Appendix II (provided in the e-companion) 2 and do not affect our results drastically. To avoid trivial cases, we assume that K is not too high relative to I and c; specifically, we assume that (I i + c ≥ i K).
Model of Technology Uncertainty
Prior research has shown that technology uncertainty has a significant influence on the product development process (Iansiti 1995, Krishnan and Bhattacharya 2002) . Consider the case of firms developing a pharmaceutical drug from a lab-discovered molecule (technology). The commercializing firm faces several types of uncertainty, which limit their chances of successfully getting regulatory and market acceptance. These include factors such as the molecule's toxicity, carcinogenicity, and efficacy, as well as endogenous factors such as firm capability in managing the project.
We model that at the beginning of technology development process, when firms make their investment decisions, they only have an estimate of the efficacy of the new product project, which determines the extent to which a firm can exploit the new innovation. In particular, when the efficacy isṽ, the resultant effective quality of the product would beṽ , whereṽ is uniformly distributed between v and 1. This implies that although the firms could increase the quality of the final product through increased investments, whether that incremental investment would translate into an innovative product and higher margins is uncertain. As v increases, a firm faces less uncertainty about its ability to create a capable product. We refer to this uncertainty as translational uncertainty because it represents a firm's ability to translate an idea into a commercially viable product. High translational uncertainty is characteristic of new-to-themarket product projects (such as the launch of the improved version of a product).
In addition, the time required for technology development is uncertain and depends on the firm capability as well as product quality, which we refer to as timing uncertainty and model, following prior research, as an exponentially distributed random variable with a probability density function e − t . Timing uncertainty is characteristic of new-to-theworld product projects (such as the new category of diabetes drugs discussed earlier in this paper). Note that the characterization of timing uncertainty using an exponential distribution allows us to capture the effect that both mean and variance of development time are positively correlated, which would be the case for such highly innovative projects.
3 The development rate , which determines the time taken for technology development, is assumed to be a function of the firm's innate development capability i -directly impacting the speed and consistency of the development process-and the level of quality improvement ( ) undertaken by that firm. To account for the fact that the time required for developing a higher quality product would be higher, we assume that is decreasing in . In particular, we use the functional form = i −1 . To consider the difference in development capabilities between the two firms, we model that when technology development is conducted by the focal firm, i = F , and when the development occurs at the partner firm, i = P . We use = F / P to represent the relative capabilities of these firms, which will be found to play a key role in future results. Our analysis shows how the choice of codevelopment mechanism is contingent on the nature of uncertainty facing the project.
Information Structure and Decision Sequence
An important part of joint development, as we have modeled in this paper, is its implementation and, in particular, the sequence of decision making and the informational assumptions that underlie the model. In the baseline case of pure revenue sharing, only the level of innovation has to be determined, but under both investment and innovation sharing, more decisions about investments have to be made in conjunction with the innovation levels, as discussed below. Without loss of generality, we assume that the focal firm makes the decision on which mechanism for joint development has to be chosen. Depending upon this choice, the decisions and implementation of contractual development could take different forms.
Under an investment sharing agreement, the decision on the level or degree of investment sharing (k) should be made before deciding the level of innovation ( ). Thus, when a firm determines its innovation level, it knows the share of costs it would receive from its partner, and hence its decision on the level of innovation would accommodate this cost sharing level. (It is trivial to note that determining k after will not have any impact of the innovation level or profits.) Either the focal or partner firm could conduct the innovation while letting its partner share a part of the development costs, so there can be two forms of investment sharing depending on who determines the level of investment sharing k and who determines the product quality . In contrast, under innovation sharing, the level of investments F and P can be determined simultaneously. Although there are other forms of innovation sharing in which these investment levels are determined sequentially, it can be easily shown that under the assumption that the integration cost is of the form as in Equation (2), simultaneous and sequential forms of innovation sharing yield identical investment levels and profits. 4 Our model is driven by the assumption that firms can infer product development investments from quality improvements in the end product. Approaches such as the function-point method in software development and project journaling make estimation of product development effort possible for a certain level of product quality and are being increasingly used in joint development projects. It is worth pointing out the manner in which collaboration was formalized and contracted in the joint development relationship between Alpha and Mega cited earlier. A joint team from both firms kept track of the man-hours spent by Alpha on every aspect of the project, and Mega compensated Alpha on quarterly basis for the effort according to a contractual agreement. In addition, we assume that firms do not have information about whether the new technology would succeed, but they do know their own capabilities and those of their partners. The implication of these assumptions is that firms can contract on the level of innovation and in turn the extent of development cost that they undertake without incurring any agency costs. 4 Proof is available from the authors upon request.
Although contractual agreements on these parameters might be imperfect in some cases, it is certainly possible in many of the industrial settings we have considered in this paper, where quality improvements are observable and measurable, and development cost curves of firms have known trajectories. Specifically, this is applicable in cases where quality improvements could be broken down to attributes such as battery life, processor speed, and drug efficacy. There is an increasing tendency for firms to engage outside firms (in particular, industrial design firms such as IDEO and contract development organizations such as Charles River Labs), which suggests that product development work may be contractible. In summary, the modeling assumptions we make about information structure and decision sequence are meant to derive first-order insights and are motivated by industrial practice.
In all of our analyses, we assume that the launch costs and marginal costs of production are constant, and for ease of exposition we normalize these costs to zero. Although the assumption of linear production cost is simplistic, the fundamental interaction between the different product development strategies considered requires only that these costs be nondecreasing. We also assume that firms are risk neutral and are interested in maximizing their expected profits. In addition, they have to make their investment into the technology before uncertainty associated with the technology is resolved. This would be realistic in conditions where lead times of innovations are much higher than normal production times, which is the case for technology and knowledge intensive industries.
Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the different product development and collaboration choices of firms. At first, we look at the case in which the firms only have a revenue sharing agreement and evaluate how this agreement influences product development investments. Subsequently, we derive the effect of investment and innovation sharing agreements on the optimal development investment. Finally, we endogenize the choice of revenue sharing whose structure embodies a bargaining framework between the two collaborating firms.
Codevelopment Under Pure Revenue Sharing
Let us first consider the case in which investment levels are decided exclusively through revenue sharing without any additional cost or effort sharing between the firms ("pure revenue sharing case"). Only one of the firms does the development work, and the decision on the quality level is also made by that firm. In this setup, the value offered by the other firm that justifies revenue sharing could be in complementary Copyright: INFORMS holds copyright to this Articles in Advance version, which is made available to institutional subscribers. The file may not be posted on any other website, including the author's site. Please send any questions regarding this policy to permissions@informs.org.
value-chain activities such as supply base or channel management. The case in which the focal firm does development work is referred to as FF revenue sharing, and the case in which partner firm does development work is referred to as PF revenue sharing.
Let us first consider the case when the focal firm does the development work. Once the technology has been successfully developed, the revenues are divided between the firms according to a revenue sharing agreement, . The focal and partner firm's profits for a given innovation level can then be represented as
Note that this is the profit of the focal firm if the new product has succeeded. However, the decision on has to be made before it is known how well the innovation can be translated to a product or how much time the development process would take. After accounting for these elements of technology uncertainty, the expected profit function of FF can be represented as follows:
Differentiating the profit function w.r.t. , we can now calculate the optimal investment level * F of the focal firm. First-order conditions (sufficient due to profit function concavity) yield *
In a similar fashion, we can also find the optimal level of innovation * P under partner revenue sharing in which innovation decision is made by the partner firm instead of focal firm: *
A casual observation of Equations (7) and (8) shows that the investment levels under pure revenue sharing are lower than under centralized decision making.
5
This distortion is because part of the benefits of the innovation accrues to a firm's partner, which reduces the marginal value of the development investment. We begin by evaluating the profits of both firms when the revenue sharing parameter is determined exogenously. Result 1 below characterizes when and how firms engage in pure revenue sharing under this case.
5 Under centralized decision making, it can be see that * i = 1 + v r i / 4 I i + c (proof available from the authors upon request).
Result 1. (a) There exists a threshold R on the development capability ratio such that if > R , it is optimal for the focal firm to conduct innovation where
Proof. All proofs are provided in Technical Appendix I (provided in the e-companion).
For starters, Result 1 simply confirms our intuitive understanding that who conducts innovation in pure revenue sharing depends on the relative development capability of the firms. If the focal firm's development capability is sufficiently higher than the partner, it prefers doing the innovation itself. The focal firm is also better served by conducting the innovation itself when the revenue sharing parameter increases, and as a result R is decreasing in .
We now examine the more complex case when the revenue sharing parameter is endogenously decided by the firms. Recall that we use the bargaining structure proposed by Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 to determine the equilibrium . For ease of exposition, we define * R to be equilibrium share of revenues of the firm who does the development work (also called the innovating firm). . Proposition 1 is interesting in that it shows that the firm that does the development work is able to retain a larger share (greater than 50%) of the total revenue. This implies that doing the development work implicitly provides the innovating firm a better bargaining position in its negotiation with its partner, which it is able to parlay into a larger share of the total profits for itself. The share of revenues R is highest when = 0 (new-revenue projects), in which case * R = 3 4
. As increases, R decreases, which illustrates the interaction between the nature of the project and consequent bargaining between firms. To understand this interaction, note that the value of innovation is most when is small (not much preexisting revenue). This is because for smaller values of , most of the value that firms attempt to share between them is as a result of the innovation. Naturally, it is most valuable to provide incentives to the innovating firm to increase investment when is small. This is achieved through offering the innovating firm a larger share of the total revenue. However, as increases, the innovation is relatively less valuable and consequently, it
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becomes less important to share a larger fraction of the total revenue to the innovating firm. As a result, * R is decreasing in . It can also be seen that the development capability of the firm that does the innovation also affects how the revenues are shared between the firms. As the development capability increases, a firm increases the amount of investment it undertakes (because the marginal value of investment increases). Because this increases the relative value of the innovation vis-à-vis , it is able to retain a larger share of the total revenue. As is to be expected, the equilibrium revenue sharing value * R is increasing in the development capability of the innovating firm.
Having characterized the effect of revenue sharing agreements on investment levels and profitability, we now turn our attention to the cases when firms also engage in cost or effort sharing agreements in addition to revenue sharing. First we look at investment sharing and its impact on investments and profits, followed by innovation sharing.
Investment Sharing
Under investment sharing, development work is done at one of the firms, with its partner sharing the investment cost. Two different forms of investment sharing emerge. The case in which the focal firm conducts innovation is referred to as FF investment sharing. When the partner firm does development work and the focal firm in turn cofinances this development, we refer to it as PF investment sharing. It follows that there are two decisions to be made under investment sharing, namely, the level of investment sharing and the level of quality improvement. Let k be the share of total development costs that the focal firm would bear and be the development work undertaken by the innovating firm. As under revenue sharing analysis, the optimal decisions of both firms can be characterized by backward induction. The following starting result characterizes the effect (an exogenous) revenue sharing parameter and the development capability have on the relative attractiveness of these two mechanisms. 
Result 2. (a) FF investment sharing is feasible iff

.
It can be seen above that revenue sharing ratio strongly impacts the viability of investment sharing. We find that investment sharing is feasible only for certain ranges of revenue sharing ratio . In particular, when is high, the focal firm obtains a larger share of the total profits compared to the partner firm, which limits the incentive of the partner to cofinance the development by the focal firm. When > F , the incentive of the partner to cofinance the focal firm's investment costs erodes to such an extent that the optimal investment sharing level goes to zero. We see a similar effect in PF investment sharing as well when is low. However, the advantage of investment sharing lies in that by sharing a part of the development costs, a firm is able to incentivize its partner to invest more into the innovation, and this can be seen by examining the profit function under investment sharing in the proof of Proposition 2 (in Technical Appendix I). Result 2 also shows how the choice for a specific form of investment sharing depends on the relative development capability of firms. As expected, a firm would prefer to have its partner conduct development work while cofinancing this investment only if the capability of its partner is sufficiently high. When the capability of its partner is low compared to itself, allowing the partner to undertake development results in lower levels of quality improvement, and for sufficiently low , a firm is better off doing the development itself.
Similar to revenue sharing, the choice between the different forms of investment sharing is also influenced by how the revenues are split between the firms. However, unlike under pure revenue sharing, we find that the threshold on capability above which a firm would like to conduct the innovation on its own is decreasing in only if > 1 2
. Note that when > 1 2 , the focal firm receives a larger share of the total revenue vis-à-vis its partner. A further reduction in in this range ( > 1 2 ) reduces the partner firm's profits even more, and hence reduces its incentives to share the development costs. Because of this, the focal firm is better served by assuming Stackelberg leadership and does so by choosing PF investment sharing. It follows that IS is decreasing in only if > 1 2 . Although the above analysis is useful in understanding interactions between development investments and cost sharing in established markets where existing contractual agreements could form the basis of codevelopment choices, negotiations between collaborating parties could determine the revenue sharing parameter in emerging product markets. We now turn our attention to such markets and examine how these mechanisms are affected when is endogenized using the Nash bargaining structure proposed earlier.
In contrast to revenue sharing, note that the level of investment sharing (k) must also be decided, making this decision part of the bargaining structure. Let * F and * P represent the equilibrium levels of revenue sharing under FF and PF investment sharing,
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Proposition 2. The equilibrium level of revenue sharing and investment sharing are as follows:
Proposition 2 is interesting in that when and k are determined through bargaining between firms, both costs and revenues are shared equally. This is quite unlike under revenue sharing where a larger share of the profits gets captured by the firm that does the development work. By engaging in investment sharing and splitting the development costs with its partner, a firm is able to achieve two objectives: It is able to induce its partner to invest in higher quality levels. In addition, it is able to improve its bargaining position in its negotiation with its partner and retain a larger share of the total profits. The fact that revenues and costs are shared equally is also interesting. This is because the equilibrium is set in a manner that provides the partnering firms adequate incentives to both invest and cofinance. In fact, when costs and revenues are shared in the same ratio, the distortions created due to multiparty decision making are eliminated, as a result of which sharing the costs and revenues equally becomes the equilibrium solution.
It is also worthwhile to point out that the equilibrium revenue sharing ratio is independent of both and the development capability of the innovating firm, which is another point of departure from revenue sharing. This is again because of the fact that any changes in both and development capability are felt equally by both firms because they share not only the revenues of the innovation but also the corresponding costs. Moreover, this difference also points to the ability of investment sharing as mechanism to align incentives of both firms as opposed to a pure revenue sharing agreement where only revenues are shared.
Innovation Sharing
Under innovation sharing, a part of the development work is conducted by the focal firm and the rest is conducted by its partner. Let F and P be the development work conducted by focal firm and partner firm, respectively. Recall that we assume that these decisions on investment levels are made simultaneously. Once the innovation materializes, firms incur an integration cost C F P = K 2 F + 2 P to bring together the quality improvements distributed across both firms. As before, we first examine the conditions under which innovation sharing is a feasible mechanism for the partnering firms.
Result 3. Innovation sharing is feasible iff ≤ ≤¯ .
We see that innovation sharing is feasible only for intermediate values of . This is because innovation sharing entails both firms to invest in development and subsequently incur the integration costs. As a result, if the integration cost parameter K is very high, the corresponding share of revenues that the firm would receive would not be sufficient to compensate the firm for the development costs that it would incur. Naturally, it will choose to invest in development only if its share of revenues is sufficiently high. If is too low, then the focal firm does not get compensated adequately for its investment, and if is too high, then the partner does not get compensated adequately. In both these cases, innovation sharing would be infeasible.
Having determined the effect of on the firms' incentive to engage in innovation sharing, we now examine what happens when is endogenized. In the following proposition, we characterize the equilibrium revenue sharing level under innovation sharing and how this level is affected by the development capability of firms. only when the development capabilities of both firms are the same, i.e., = 1. This is because, unlike under investment sharing or revenue sharing, both firms are involved directly in the development work when they engage in innovation sharing. Coincidentally, the extent of bargaining power-and the corresponding share of revenues that this power provides-depends on the amount of development work undertaken by a firm. When the development capabilities of firms are the same, they invest exactly the same amount, and hence the revenues are also shared equally. However, when the development capabilities of the firms are not the same, the firm with higher capability seems to have a greater incentive to undertake more development work than its partner, thereby also earning a higher share of revenue.
Comparison of Codevelopment Mechanisms
Thus far, we have focused our efforts on identifying how cost and effort sharing mechanisms should be
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implemented. However, as we saw in the industrial examples discussed earlier, firms in different contexts typically use one of these mechanisms to manage the joint development process. This raises the important question as to whether there are conditions-both market and project related-that make these mechanisms appropriate for different conditions. To answer this question, we now look at how these mechanisms compare against each other and characterize the conditions of appropriateness of each of these mechanisms in Propositions 4-7.
Proposition 4 (Effect of Endogenous Revenue Sharing (Bargaining) on Codevelopment Mechanisms):
(a) PF revenue sharing is dominated by the other revenue and cost sharing mechanisms and is never optimal at equilibrium.
(
b) FF investment sharing is dominated by the other revenue and cost sharing mechanisms and is never optimal at equilibrium.
Proposition 4 shows that if the focal firm were to choose investment sharing as the mechanism to collaborate with its partner, it should let the partner do the innovation and cofinance the development. However, if pure revenue sharing is the mechanism that is chosen, it should rather conduct the development itself. This is because of the interaction between the type of mechanism that is chosen and the resultant bargaining between firms to determine the equilibrium revenue sharing level . Recall that under investment sharing revenues are shared equally, whereas with pure revenue sharing the firm that conducts the innovation is able to retain a larger portion (50%-75%) of the total revenue. The suboptimality of FF investment sharing and PF revenue sharing is primarily because of this reason. If the focal firm were to seek cofinancing from its partner when it does the development work, it would have to forgo a significant portion of the revenues in the process at the bargaining stage. Thus, although investment sharing results in better allocation of costs and, hence, potentially higher development investment, the resultant lower bargaining power makes a firm less willing to consider it for collaboration. As a result, FF revenue sharing always dominates FF investment sharing. However, when at equilibrium it is the partner who does the innovation, it would be in a firm's best interests to engage in investment sharing with its partner. The focal firm achieves two objectives by doing this: it is able to ensure that the partner invests sufficiently high amount; in addition, investment sharing provides it the bargaining power to obtain a larger share of the total profits. As a result, PF investment sharing dominates PF revenue sharing. Due to these dominance results, from here on we will refer to PF investment sharing as investment sharing and FF revenue sharing as revenue sharing. We now examine the effect of timing uncertainty on a firm's preference for cost and effort sharing. Because T and P represent a firm's ability to manage timing uncertainty, examining the choice among different mechanisms as a function of these parameters allows us to capture the effect of timing uncertainty. Proposition 5 shows that the preferred form of codevelopment depends critically on the development capability and associated timing uncertainty. In particular, investment sharing is the dominant mechanism when the development capability of the focal firm is low, and revenue sharing is the dominant mechanism when its capability is high. When development capability falls in the intermediate range, innovation sharing is the dominant mechanism.
One of the reasons why revenue sharing is the preferred mechanism when the focal firm's capability is high is because an innovating firm is able to retain a larger share of the total revenue under revenue sharing. Because the level of investment is determined by the firm that gets the larger share of revenues (in this case, the focal firm), it does not result in that much inefficiency/quality deterioration compared with investment sharing. More importantly, because the focal firm's capability is also sufficiently high, there isn't much of a penalty for lack of collaboration. Although investment sharing would have enabled better allocation of costs, it would require the firm to forgo a large fraction of the revenues, so it ceases to be a viable option. However, when the firm's capability is low compared with its partner's (low ), it becomes important to ensure that the development work is conducted by the partner firm. By engaging in investment sharing when is low, a firm is able to ensure that its partner's investment is sufficiently high in addition to obtaining a better bargaining position to retain a large enough share of the total profits. As a result, investment sharing becomes the optimal mechanism when is low.
More interestingly, we find that innovation sharing dominates both investment sharing and revenue sharing when is in the intermediate range.
This is because the economies of specialization that innovation sharing benefits from enable each firm to concentrate on aspects that are closer to its core capability and ensure higher levels of innovation with lower investment costs. When capabilities of both firms are comparable, it benefits to resort to innovation sharing, have the development work split between both firms, and exploit the economies of specialization that this division provides. However, such a division of effort also comes with an explicit cost in the form of integration costs. If the integration cost parameter K is too high, the benefits of specialization do not adequately compensate for the higher integration costs, and innovation sharing ceases to be optimal. Now let us consider the impact of translational uncertainty on the choice of mechanisms. To this end, we let the development capability of both firms F and P to tend to , or let the resource cost parameter c tend to 0. Because firms face no timing uncertainty either when their development capability is very high or when the resource costs are negligible, the case in which T P → or c = 0 can be used to characterize the effects of translational uncertainty.
Proposition 6 (Effect of Translational Uncertainty). When T P → , or = 0: (a) Investment sharing is dominated by innovation sharing and revenue sharing. (b) There exists a threshold on the integration cost K c such that is K < K c , innovation sharing is the dominant mechanism.
The primary reason for the nonoptimality of investment sharing under translational uncertainty is its effect on the revenue sharing negotiation between firms. In our model, when there is no timing uncertainty, the development capability of firms does not impact which mechanism is preferred. As result, revenue sharing, which allows the focal firm to obtain a larger share of the total revenue, dominates investment sharing. However, if the integration costs are sufficiently low, then innovation sharing becomes the dominant mechanism. This is because the distributed effort and cost function convexity under innovation sharing reduces the development cost and provides adequate incentives for innovating firms to invest in greater levels of product quality improvement. Thus, translational uncertainty lends itself to innovation sharing, and timing uncertainty favors investment sharing.
Proposition 7. When investment sharing is the dominant mechanism, the combined profits of both firms match that of a centralized decision-making setup in which development work is conducted by a single firm.
Proposition 7 is useful in that it shows investment sharing mechanism can replicate a centralized decision-making setup because revenues and costs are shared equally between the firms (Proposition 2). Distortions associated with a multiparty decision-making setup are eliminated because revenue and cost implications of any investment are borne equally by both firms. This reduces any incentive by the innovating firm to underinvest, which is the primary reason for the inefficiency in a pure revenue sharing mechanism. As a result, the combined profits of both firms under investment sharing could be the same as that of a centralized decision-making setup.
Sensitivity Analysis of Codevelopment Mechanisms
To understand the sensitivity of the above results about the relative attractiveness of investment and innovation sharing to changes in market and technological parameters, we discuss the results of numerical analysis, which illustrate the effects of timing uncertainty, translational uncertainty, and nature of technology on the codevelopment mechanism a firm should adopt. This analysis leads to four observations that are valid for a large range of technological and market parameters. In all of the analyses depicted as figures, the vertical axes of the figures represent the profits of the focal firm for the different mechanisms and the horizontal axes represent the development capability ratio of the firms ( ). In the first observation below, we examine how the preferred codevelopment mechanism is affected by an increase in timing uncertainty. The results of this numerical analysis are represented in the two graphs that form Figure 2 . In the graph on the left side of this figure, we represent the scenario when the resource costs are low (c = 1), whereas on the right the resource costs are higher (c = 2). Because the effects of timing uncertainty are greater when resource costs are higher, an increase in the resource costs (c = 1 to c = 2) allows us to characterize a firm's optimal response to an increase in timing uncertainty. Observation 1. An increase in the effect of timing uncertainty increases the value of codevelopment using investment sharing and reduces the relative value of pure revenue sharing.
As seen in Figure 2 , an increase in timing uncertainty makes codevelopment using either investment sharing or innovation sharing more valuable than a pure revenue sharing arrangement. This can be inferred by comparing the two graphs in Figure 2 and considering the range of the development capability for which both investment and innovation sharing are optimal. As we move to the right, the shaded region, which corresponds to the region of dominance of revenue sharing, shrinks in size, and the threshold development capability below which investment sharing is attractive increases (implying that an increase in
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INFORMS holds copyright to this Articles in Advance version, which is made available to institutional subscribers. The file may not be posted on any other website, including the author's site. Please send any questions regarding this policy to permissions@informs.org. timing uncertainty would make investment sharing more attractive). Because innovation sharing involves development work being conducted by both firms, the expected development time required under innovation sharing relative to investment could be higher, particularly when the focal firm's development capability is low relative to that of its partner. This also implies that resource allocation costs for innovation sharing would be higher compared with investment sharing. As a result, an increase in c affects the viability of innovation sharing more than it affects investment sharing. It follows that the optimal response to an increase in c would be to engage in investment sharing even for higher values of . This result of increasing attractiveness of investment sharing, however, does not carry over to the case when the development capability of the focal firm is high. Recall from Proposition 5 that when the development capability of a firm is high, it is optimal to either engage in pure revenue sharing or innovation sharing. Under such situations, an increase in c actually pushes a firm toward innovation sharing in place of pure revenue sharing. This can again be observed by comparing the two graphs in Figure 2 , where we see that the threshold of below which innovation sharing is optimal is lower when the resource costs are higher (c = 2). This is because incentive alignment benefits that innovation sharing provide compared with revenue sharing results in higher development investments from both firms. When the resource costs increase, the relative value of such an incentive alignment also increases because of the higher marginal costs of development. In addition, the higher development time makes splitting the fixed costs between firms more valuable, and innovation sharing becomes more attractive compared with revenue sharing.
Two other project dimensions that influence a firm's preferred mode of codevelopment are the nature of the revenues of the development project and the degree of translational uncertainty. In Figure 3 , we look at how a change in (which captures the extent to which a development project generates new revenues) affects the optimal codevelopment mechanism.
Observation 2. For new-revenue projects, investment and innovation sharing are more attractive codevelopment approaches than pure revenue sharing.
New-revenue projects have the most to gain when firms engage in codevelopment through investment and innovation sharing. This is illustrated through a comparison of the focal firm's optimal codevelopment strategy for different values of , the analysis of which is represented in the two graphs in Figure 3 . In the graph on the left, = 0, which corresponds to projects with no preexisting revenue (all revenues accrue from this innovation), whereas in the graph on the right we have that = 0 25, which corresponds to replacement-revenue projects. Although the structures of the optimal policy as represented in both of these graphs have a similar form, we see that the thresholds of that demarcate the regions of optimality of codevelopment mechanisms are different depending on whether is small or large. As the comparison between these two graphs suggests, we can see that when increases from 0 to 0 25, the range of parameters for which investment sharing and innovation sharing are optimal decreases.
Why are the codevelopment mechanisms proposed in this paper (investment and innovation sharing) more valuable for new-revenue projects than for replacement-revenue projects? One possible reason is that the value of collaboration is greatest for newrevenue projects. When is small or negligible, the entire value that firms seek to maximize is a direct consequence of the development work that is undertaken. Under such circumstances, it becomes very important for the firms to choose mechanisms that induce higher investment levels. Because both investment and innovation sharing align incentives of firms and increase their development investments, and, consequently, the level of innovation, these mechanisms also become most valuable when is low. Additionally, the reduction in the fixed development costs that occurs under innovation sharing allows firms to realize higher quality with lower costs. In contrast, when is high, the value generated through the new innovation is lower, and the ability to retain a larger share of the total revenue becomes the overarching objective. As a result, revenue sharing that allows the innovating firm to retain a larger share of the total revenue to itself becomes the dominant mechanism. We now focus on the effect of translational uncertainty on a firm's preferred mode of codevelopment. In particular, we examine the shift in a firm's codevelopment strategy as it moves from a project with low translational uncertainty to another project with high translational uncertainty. Note that the presence of timing uncertainty is what makes this analysis distinct from Proposition 6.
Observation 3. For projects facing both translational and timing uncertainty, investment sharing competes with innovation sharing for new-revenue products and with pure revenue sharing for replacement revenue products.
We find that innovation sharing is relatively less attractive compared with investment sharing and revenue sharing for replacement-revenue projects that have both timing and translational uncertainty. This can be seen by comparing the two graphs in Figure 4 , which represent different levels of translational uncertainty. In the graph on the left, we have that v = 0 8 (representing low translational uncertainty), and in the graph on the right we have that v = 0 2 (representing high translational uncertainty). In contrast, when firms face both timing and translational uncertainty for new-revenue projects, we find that investment sharing and innovation sharing are dominant forms of codevelopment. This can be seen by examining Figure 2 for which = 0 and comparing it with Figure 4 .
As before, we can compare the specific thresholds on within which innovation sharing is optimal for these different levels of v to illustrate how the codevelopment strategy should be adjusted to the level of translational uncertainty in a replacement-revenue project. This comparison shows that the range of development capability ratio for which both revenue sharing and investment sharing are optimal increases as v increases, implying that when firms face both timing and translational uncertainty, revenue sharing and investment sharing are the dominant mechanisms. To understand this result, note that the effects of timing uncertainty are most felt by innovation sharing, particularly when development capabilities of firms are different (high or low ). As a result, when the translational uncertainty associated with a project is already very high, exacerbating its effect by taking upon timing uncertainty as well might not be optimal. It follows that both investment sharing and revenue sharing, which face less timing uncertainty and no integration costs, become dominant mechanisms for larger ranges when translational uncertainty in a replacement revenue project is higher. Until now we have assumed that the outside options of both firms were identical. 6 We now examine how the structure and operationalization of codevelopment is affected when this assumption is relaxed. These results are depicted in the two graphs in Figure 5 -in the graph on the left, the outside option of PF is 0.05 and that of FF is 0, whereas in the graph on the right, we have that the outside option of PF is 0 and that of FF is 0.05. Comparing these graphs with Figure 2 , where we assume that outside options of both firms are zero, helps us characterize the impact of these options on codevelopment choices. Whether FF prefers innovation sharing or pure revenue sharing depends on how its own value of the outside option compares with that of the rival. In particular, we find that when the outside option of the partner is higher, innovation sharing becomes the dominant mechanism. In contrast, when the focal firm's outside option is higher compared with its partner's, pure revenue sharing is sufficient to coordinate the codevelopment process. To understand why a higher value of outside option makes innovation sharing preferable, recall that the focal firm tends to retain a larger fraction of the project value under pure revenue sharing, as a result of which it is more likely for the partner firm to opt out under this agreement. Thus, revenue sharing is less likely to align incentives and hence becomes less attractive. In contrast, innovation sharing results in a more equitable distribution of project value because the revenues are shared (loosely) according to their development investments. This enables better incentive alignment and hence makes it less likely for the partner firm to opt out. However, when FF's outside option is higher, eliminating its incentives to opt out becomes more important. Naturally, revenue sharing, which allows the focal firm to retain a larger share of the revenues to itself, becomes the preferred mode of codevelopment.
Our numerical analysis also shows that the equilibrium under investment sharing is no longer 1 2 . Similarly, the presence of outside options can also lead to a pure revenue sharing agreement where the equilibrium * R is greater than . Thus, the availability of outside options also provides a better bargaining position for a firm with respect to its partner and allows it to capture a larger share of the realized project value. The implication of these observations is that the bargaining power with which a firm enters the negotiation process plays an important role in the operational implementation of codevelopment. It influences both how the revenues are split between firms and determines which mechanism is the optimal mode of codevelopment.
Managerial Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, we conceptualize and model the revenue, cost, and effort sharing collaborative arrangements between two firms and characterize the optimal joint-development approach for various technological and market parameters. We find that the preferred codevelopment approach should go beyond simple revenue sharing, under which there exists an incentive for an innovating firm to underinvest in quality improvements. The cost and effort sharing mechanisms presented in this paper have the potential to address the inefficiencies associated with multiparty decision making. We found from our analysis that investment and innovation sharing are more appropriate for collaboration depending on a variety of conditions. In particular, when firms have distinctive capabilities, innovation sharing agreements help firms exploit their specialized product development capabilities and provide firms the appropriate incentives to ensure greater investments in technology and product development. However, when development capability is concentrated in one of the firms, the additional integration costs of innovation sharing reduce its attractiveness. Because the quality distortion effects of multiparty decision making are eliminated through investment sharing under such conditions, investment sharing helps attain optimal investments in development and becomes the optimal mode of codevelopment. The insights from the modeling and analysis of the codevelopment problem are distilled into a conceptual framework in Figure 6 . This framework provides managerial insights by demarcating the regions of appropriateness of the different codevelopment approaches. Specifically, the cost sharing approaches are more appropriate for new-revenue projects. Innovation sharing is more appropriate for projects with translational uncertainty, and investment sharing outperforms the other approaches for projects with Type of project uncertainty Type of project revenue predominant timing uncertainty. When the project involves the launch of a product with incremental revenues, revenue sharing is sufficient to facilitate the collaboration.
The above framework can be used to interpret, in part, why some firms resort to sharing the development work (innovation sharing) in multifirm development, whereas we see the funding of the development work in other situations. Consider the computer industry where most products are new to the market rather than new to the world and are introduced around major industry events and conferences. In this case, timing is determined by outside events and the uncertainty is more of the translational kind (quality of the product). Our framework would recommend an innovation sharing approach for such cases. We discussed earlier Dell's efforts to complement its suppliers, who perform upstream component development activities, leaving Dell with the system integration and qualification activities. In fact, the supplier selection processes at Dell ensure that vendor skills complement its core capabilities in operational integration (Financial Times 2003 , Hachman 2002 ). This puts it in the top left of the framework in Figure 6 .
In contrast, the pharmaceutical industry is characterized by long and highly uncertain lead times for drug development and, hence, correspondingly high resource allocation costs, high levels of development uncertainty, and development capabilities that are concentrated in small biotech firms, all of which result in high timing uncertainty. More importantly, strong regulatory influence (from the likes of the Food and Drug Administration in the United States), which makes it necessary for products to possess a bare minimum quality, forces firms to continue working until such progress is achieved, making their challenge managing the development time rather than the final product quality. We believe that these industry and technology characteristics have made investment sharing the popular form of contractual development in the pharmaceutical industry (top right of the framework in Figure 6 ).
Our analysis, which provides concrete guidelines on how the codevelopment approach needs to be tailored to the nature of the project/product, still is quite stylized and represents merely a groundbreaking effort. Collaborative product development is a rich topic with a whole host of issues that need to be studied to determine how relationships between firms must be structured and nurtured. Complex interactions between firms in a product development context seem to limit the degree to which inefficiencies stemming from lack of coordination can be reduced compared to a supply chain/distribution context where primarily prices and quantities are being negotiated. Further analytical and empirical work would enhance our understanding of these complex yet important issues. In the first phase of the work, we made a number of stylized assumptions to obtain compact analytical expressions. In addition to assuming specific forms for development cost functions similar to the ones used in the literature, we also ignored agency costs associated with cooperative effort. A firm's investments normally extend beyond money into human resources, intellectual capital, and a host of other factors that are not verifiable across firms. Although, expressing the development investment in terms of quality improvement (quality could be quantified in terms of battery life, processor speed, or memory capacity in most technology intensive industries) brings in a degree of verifiability to the process, several other soft issues like trust make the problem difficult to quantify. Although we recognize the existence and importance of these factors, we believe that modeling these are beyond the scope of this research, and we leave those as an avenue for future research.
We also modeled the case when firms make decisions with complete information about each other's costs and incentives. Although this would be true for advanced development projects where collaborating firms have to work very closely (particularly if they collaborated successfully in the past), it might not be appropriate for R&D initiatives of firms that do not have a history of collaboration with each other. Additional work needs to be conducted to understand how asymmetric information about market demand will impact development decisions. We also ignored manufacturing and launch costs, which could be important in some industries. Interactions between these costs and product design choices could have a significant impact on joint-development decisions, and modeling these issues is an avenue for future research. More broadly, we also restricted our analysis to the case of a single technology and product development firm. In reality, multiple technology suppliers go to market through multiple product development firms, and understanding competitive interactions between multiple suppliers and product development firms would further enrich this discussion. A more detailed model of technology uncertainty and distributed product development would expand the applicability of this research.
In summary, conceptualization, model formulation, analysis, and discussion of multifirm product development has produced a number of interesting insights. First, it is important to consider technology and market characteristics in conjunction with economic and operational issues when making product development decisions. Second, investment and innovation sharing, proposed as codevelopment mechanisms on top of revenue sharing mechanisms, can help product development firms coordinate investments and achieve better quality products and higher profitability for firms.
Investment sharing is a better mechanism when firm capabilities are dissimilar and projects face significant timing uncertainty. However, when firms are similar in terms of their capabilities and collaborate on new-to-market product projects with significant translational uncertainty, innovation sharing is better suited to leverage the specialized skills of individual innovating firms. We believe the modeling and the framework derived from the analytical results in this paper provide a richer understanding of collaborative product development (beyond the current general discussion found in the business press) and lay the groundwork for more advances on this increasingly important topic.
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